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BY JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, ESQ.
More than 30 years ago, a California appellate court decision 
(San Diego Navy Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance 
Society, 162 Cal. App. 3d 358 (4th Dist. 1984)) worked a 
revolution of sorts by ruling that, in cases of conflict between 
an insurer and a policyholder defending against a plaintiff’s 
claim, the insurer was obligated to permit the policyholder 
to select its own defense counsel rather than having the case 
defended by an attorney selected by the insurer.
The California legislature 
essentially codified Cumis in 
California Civil Code § 2860. Cases 
or legislation from other jurisdictions 
followed suit enough to make Cumis 
the majority rule, and to make the term 
“Cumis counsel” common insurance 
parlance. See Randy Maniloff & 
Jeffrey Stempel, General Liability 
Insurance coverage: Key Issues in 
Every State, Ch. 6 (3d ed., 2015) 
(state-by-state survey). 
The classic case presenting 
a Cumis-style conflict involves a 
claim in which the plaintiff sues the 
policyholder alleging multiple claims, 
some of which may fall within the 
liability insurance coverage and some 
of which may not. For example, a 
patron roughed up by a bouncer at a 
club may allege both assault and battery 
by the bouncer, as well as inadequate 
training by the club and negligent 
injurious conduct by the bouncer. Thus, 
because the outcome of the case can 
affect coverage, policyholder defendants 
often seek to choose their own defense 
counsel, reasoning that a lawyer selected 
by the insurer (and most defense counsel 
chosen by insurers is approved “panel” 
counsel that obtains a significant amount 
of business from insurers), may have an 
incentive (perhaps even subconscious) 
to defend the case in a manner that 
makes a finding of uncovered battery 
more likely than might be the case if the 
policyholder’s chosen counsel defended 
the litigation.
The Cumis 
movement was 
more evolutionary 
than revolutionary in 
Nevada. Until State  Farm 
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hansen, 
131 Nev. Adv. Op. 74 (Sept. 24, 
2015), Nevada law was not clear on 
the point, although most observers 
expected that Nevada would eventually 
follow California’s lead on this topic, 
particularly after Nevada Yellow Cab 
Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 
152 P.3d 737, 742 (Nev. 2007). Yellow 
Cab ruled that both the policyholder/
defendant and the insurer were clients 
of the attorney defending the case but 
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that, in cases of 
conflict, the 
attorney’s greater duty was 
to the insured defendant.   
Having embraced the 
two-client model of the insurer-
attorney-policyholder relationship 
but favoring policyholder interests in the 
event of conflict, the next logical step was to 
require independent counsel rather than placing 
insurer-selected counsel in the difficult position 
of attempting to adequately represent two client 
with divergent interests. See Jeffrey Stempel, 
“The Relationship Between Defense Counsel, 
Policyholders, and Insurers: Nevada Rides Yellow 
Cab Toward “Two-Client” Model of Tripartite 
Relationship. Are Cumis Counsel and Malpractice 
Claims by Insurers Next?,” Nevada Lawyer (June 
2007) p. 20. 
The Cumis movement was more 
evolutionary than revolutionary 
in Nevada. Until State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hansen, 131 
Nev. Adv. Op. 74 (Sept. 24, 2015), 
Nevada law was not clear on the point, 
although most observers expected 
that Nevada would eventually follow 
California’s lead on this topic, 
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Arguably, the two-client model is not a prerequisite to 
requiring independent counsel in cases of conflict. If the defense 
attorney’s only client is the policyholder, this presumably 
heightens the judicial system’s interest in ensuring that counsel’s 
loyalty is undivided and not colored by concern for the insurer, 
who even if not a client is a third-party payer with substantial 
contract rights (under the policy) to control defense and settlement 
of the case. Relatedly, insurers expect regular updates from 
defense counsel on the status of a case, which can place counsel 
in a quandary about whether or not to report developments that 
may support a coverage defense. The insurer is also a client, 
presumably entitled to full disclosure by counsel of all matters 
relevant to the representation — but perhaps not when this is 
contrary to the interests of the policyholder client.  
Perhaps the most important question remaining open 
after Hansen is independent defense counsel’s selection and 
compensation. California has a statutory provision stating that 
counsel must have at least five years of litigation practice, 
including “substantial defense experience in the subject at issue in 
the litigation,” as well as professional liability insurance. Further:
[t]he insurer’s obligation to pay fees to the independent 
counsel selected by the insured is limited to the rates which 
are actually paid by the insurer to attorneys retained by it 
in the ordinary course of business in the defense of similar 
actions in the community where the claim arose or is being 
defended. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2860(c); see also Wallis 
v. Centennial Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 2d 1114 (E.D. Cal. 
2013) (insurer not required to pay entire bill submitted by 
independent counsel where counsel offered no evidence of 
reasonableness and necessity of unpaid fees); J.R. Mktg., 
L.L.C. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 41 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2013) rev. granted, 308 P.3d 860 (Sept. 18, 2013) 
(where insurer breaches duty to defend, it loses protection 
of the statute regarding rate to be paid to reimburse 
policyholder for funding its own defense).
In the most recent issue of his newsletter Coverage Opinions, 
Randy Maniloff finds a silver lining of Hansen that insurers are 
overlooking. Maniloff’s prediction is that the Nevada Supreme 
Court, having so fully embraced Cumis, is likely to embrace the 
California Cumis statute regarding the rate of pay for independent 
counsel as well. See A Win for Insurers: Nevada Supreme Court 
Adopts “Cumis” Rule, available at http://coverageopinions.info/
Vol4Issue9 at p. 15 (Sept. 30, 2015). Perhaps this prediction will 
prove accurate. California has operated under its approach for 
many years, with apparent success.   
But although the California approach makes 
good sense as a tool or starting point for determining 
independent counsel’s compensation, it should perhaps 
not be an absolute rule. Insurers have a good argument 
in contending that a policyholder should not be able to 
select a $1,000/hour Wall Street law firm as independent 
counsel on the liability insurer’s tab when the insurer 
ordinarily pays $200/hour (or less) to panel counsel. But 
converse unfairness can result if the insurer is able to 
cap independent counsel fees below the rate at which the 
policyholder can obtain adequate counsel of its choice.
Insurers are able to obtain counsel at lower rates 
(unduly low rates, according to most any defense lawyer) 
because of the insurer’s purchasing power and leverage. 
But policyholders, particularly individuals and small 
businesses, lack such leverage and often also lack the 
expertise necessary for finding the most low-cost defense 
attorneys for a given case. In order to make a truly 
independent selection of counsel (e.g., an attorney not 
recommended by the insurer), policyholders may have to 
pay something more than the going rate for panel counsel. 
Policyholders should also note that it is the insurer’s 
conduct in disputing coverage that created the need for 
independent counsel. Although a reservation of rights 
does not create a per se conflict under Hansen, an 
insurer’s defense without reservation would eliminate 
possible conflicts and permit the insurer to defend through 
panel counsel.  
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